

No. 12-16752

---

---

IN THE  
**United States Court of Appeals  
for the Ninth Circuit**

---

PULASKI & MIDDLEMAN, LLC; JIT PACKAGING, INC.;  
RK WEST, INC.; RICHARD OESTERLING,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

GOOGLE INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

---

On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Northern District of California, No. 5:08-cv-03369-EJD  
District Judge Edward J. Davila

---

**GOOGLE INC.'S PETITION FOR REHEARING  
OR REHEARING EN BANC**

---

MICHAEL G. RHODES  
WHITTY SOMVICHIAN  
KYLE C. WONG  
COOLEY LLP  
101 California Street, 5th Floor  
San Francisco, CA 94111-5800  
(415) 693-2000  
rhodesmg@cooley.com  
wsomvichian@cooley.com  
kwong@cooley.com

NEAL KUMAR KATYAL  
MARY HELEN WIMBERLY  
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP  
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20004  
(202) 637-5600  
neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com  
maryhelen.wimberly@hoganlovells.com

*Counsel for Defendant-Appellee  
Google Inc.*

October 19, 2015

[Additional counsel on inside cover]

---

---

Additional Counsel:

THOMAS P. SCHMIDT  
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP  
875 Third Avenue  
New York, N.Y. 10022  
(212) 918-5547  
thomas.schmidt@hoganlovells.com

## **CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT**

Pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendant-Appellee Google Inc. makes the following disclosure statement:

Google Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Alphabet Inc., a publicly traded company (NASDAQ: GOOG, GOOGL). Accordingly, Alphabet Inc. has more than 10% ownership of Google Inc.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .....	i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....	iii
INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35 STATEMENT .....	1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .....	5
REASONS WHY REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED .....	9
THE PANEL’S OPINION BREAKS WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE LAW IN OTHER CIRCUITS.....	9
A.    The Supreme Court and Other Circuits Have Held That Damage Calculations Must Be Considered in the Predominance Analysis .....	10
B.    The Panel’s Embrace of “Trial by Formula” Conflicts with Supreme Court and Sister Circuit Precedent.....	13
CONCLUSION .....	19
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE	
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
ADDENDUM	

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	<u>Page(s)</u>
<b>CASES:</b>	
<i>Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor</i> , 521 U.S. 591 (1997).....	8
<i>Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i> , 765 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2014) .....	18
<i>Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc.</i> , 155 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998) .....	3, 17
<i>Comcast Corp. v. Behrend</i> , 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co.</i> , 23 Cal. 4th 163 (2000) .....	15
<i>Day v. AT&amp;T Corp.</i> , 63 Cal. App. 4th 325 (1998) .....	15
<i>Epenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC</i> , 705 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2013) .....	17
<i>In re Deepwater Horizon</i> , 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2015) .....	12
<i>In re Fibreboard Corp.</i> , 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990) .....	17
<i>In re Nexium Antitrust Litig.</i> , 777 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015).....	11
<i>In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.</i> , 725 F.3d 244 (D.C. Cir. 2013).....	12
<i>In re Tobacco Cases II</i> , 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 881 (Ct. App. 2015) .....	15, 16
<i>In re Urethane Antitrust Litig.</i> , 768 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) .....	18

**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued**

	<u>Page</u>
<i>Marsu, B.V. v. Walt Disney Co.</i> , 185 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 1999) .....	16
<i>McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co.</i> , 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008) .....	17
<i>Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp.</i> , 778 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2015) .....	3, 11
<i>Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.</i> , 461 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2006) .....	13
<i>Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo</i> , 135 S. Ct. 2806 (2015).....	4, 14, 18
<i>Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy Inc.</i> , 725 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2013) .....	12
<i>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes</i> , 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co.</i> , 595 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 2010) .....	12
<i>Yokoyama v. Midland National Life Ins. Co.</i> , 594 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2010) .....	2, 8
<b>STATUTES:</b>	
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) .....	2, 14
<b>RULES:</b>	
Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(1) .....	4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 .....	1, 2, 9, 14
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).....	<i>passim</i>

IN THE  
**United States Court of Appeals  
for the Ninth Circuit**

---

No. 12-16752

---

PULASKI & MIDDLEMAN, LLC; JIT PACKAGING, INC.;  
RK WEST, INC.; RICHARD OESTERLING,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v.  
GOOGLE INC.,  
Defendant-Appellee.

---

On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Northern District of California, No. 5:08-cv-03369-EJD  
District Judge Edward J. Davila

---

**GOOGLE INC.’S PETITION FOR REHEARING  
OR REHEARING EN BANC**

---

**INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35 STATEMENT**

This case concerns the rules governing certification of class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The Supreme Court’s recent interventions in this area have made two principles unmistakably clear. The first is that plaintiffs “cannot show Rule 23(b)(3) predominance” where “[q]uestions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.” *Comcast Corp. v. Behrend*, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013). And second, “[b]ecause the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge, enlarge

or modify any substantive right,’ ” a court cannot, under the banner of Rule 23, “replace [individualized] proceedings with Trial by Formula.” *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)). The panel’s decision—reversing the District Court’s refusal to certify a class of Google advertisers claiming violations of California’s unfair competition laws—transgresses both principles, and joins the wrong side of two circuit splits in the process. Google Inc. respectfully asks the Court to correct its errors through this petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc.

The panel transgressed the first principle by adhering to a categorical, bright-line rule set forth in a 2010 panel opinion that “damage calculations alone cannot defeat [class] certification.” *Yokoyama v. Midland National Life Ins. Co.*, 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). That rule did not survive *Comcast*. Indeed, *Comcast* held exactly the opposite: where “[q]uestions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class,” plaintiffs “cannot show Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.” *Comcast*, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. Faced with those conflicting directives, the panel concluded that the District Court had *erred* in refusing to apply the abrogated *Yokoyama* rule. The panel thus reversed the District Court without even asking whether—let alone finding that—common questions of liability would predominate over individual issues of restitution. ADD14, 17. The panel’s approach squarely conflicts with *Comcast*, and breaks



from decisions of the First, Second, Fourth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, which have faithfully followed *Comcast* in holding that “damages questions *should be considered* at the certification stage when weighing predominance issues.” *E.g., Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp.*, 778 F.3d 401, 408 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).

The panel transgressed the second principle by approving Plaintiffs’ proposed method of computing restitution based on a general, one-size-fits-all formula for the whole class. It did so *because* the proposed classwide formula for calculating restitution did “not turn on individual circumstances.” ADD20. But that, of course, is precisely the problem. *Wal-Mart* expressly “disapprove[d]” just that “novel project” of computing class damages by a formula “without further individualized proceedings.” 131 S. Ct. at 2561. *Wal-Mart*’s holding on that point follows from the Rules Enabling Act: “Trial by Formula” forecloses individual defenses and sets damages for plaintiffs at amounts divorced from their particular circumstances, thereby giving plaintiffs greater substantive rights than they would have in individual proceedings. *Id.* Consistent with the limitation of the Rules Enabling Act, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have all held that damages in class actions cannot be computed “on abstract analysis of ‘averages.’” *E.g., Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc.*, 155 F.3d 331, 343 (4th Cir. 1998). The panel’s decision erroneously joins the minority view of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, contrary to *Wal-Mart*’s teachings. *See generally Tyson Foods,*

*Inc. v. Bouaphakeo*, 135 S. Ct. 2806 (2015) (granting review of Eighth Circuit decision).

The end result will be an unwieldy class comprised of hundreds of thousands of different advertisers who purchased millions of different ads from Google over the course of several different years. That entire class will demand restitution from Google for alleged violations of California’s unfair competition laws—never mind that some putative class members *benefited* from the alleged misconduct. And it will do so by punching numbers into an abstract formula, even though—as the District Court rightly found—determining each class member’s entitlement to restitution and the proper amount of any such restitution requires a “complex and highly individualized analysis.” ER23.

Review by the en banc court is necessary to undo that anomalous result. The panel decision “conflicts with” *Comcast* and *Wal-Mart* and deepens a division among the circuits regarding standards of class certification. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(1). It threatens to turn the Ninth Circuit into a class-action magnet. And, on the merits, this case should not proceed as a class action; the panel was only able to approve that course by bending the substantive law of restitution to fit the needs of class adjudication and robbing Google of its right to present defenses. Procedural rules are supposed to serve substantive law, not the other way around. This Court

should grant rehearing or rehearing en banc to bring its class-action jurisprudence in line with *Comcast* and *Wal-Mart*.

### **FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

Google AdWords is an online advertising service. It allows advertisers to place ads alongside Google search results or on other webpages that are part of Google's advertising network. ER2. The ads are matched to Internet users based on the queries they enter on Google (or other search engines) or the subject-matter of the website they are viewing. ADD5-6. The ads are generally short strings of text with hyperlinks that, when clicked, take the user to the advertiser's website. *Id.* And advertisers typically pay Google each time an Internet user clicks on an advertisement link. ADD5.

Plaintiffs in this suit all purchased advertising services from Google AdWords. They allege that Google misled them in violation of California law by showing their ads on two types of websites: "parked domains" and "error pages." ADD6. A "parked domain" is a webpage with a registered address that is relatively undeveloped and consists primarily of ads or links. "Error pages" act as placeholders when a user enters an address that does not match a registered URL. Google generally displays ads on parked domains and error pages that are matched to a user's query, so the ads a user sees are typically relevant to what the user was looking for. ER2.

**Proceedings Below.** Plaintiffs brought this putative class action against Google under California’s Unfair Competition and Fair Advertising Laws, claiming that Google displayed their ads on these two types of allegedly “low quality” sites. ER14. Damages are unavailable under those laws, so Plaintiffs sought equitable restitution. They moved to certify a class consisting of “[a]ll Google AdWords Customers who, during the [class period], were charged by Google for clicks on their advertisements that Google placed on parked domains or error pages.” ER12.

The District Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (allowing certification only if “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”). The Court was “unconvinced” that “commonalities predominate.” ER22. The main obstacle was “the individual nature of the restitutionary relief sought.” *Id.* Plaintiffs’ theory rested on “what AdWords customers would have paid ‘but for’ the alleged misstatements or omissions.” ER23. Yet, as the Court explained, “any effort to determine what advertisers ‘would have paid’ \* \* \* requires a complex and highly individualized analysis of advertiser behavior for each particular ad that was placed.” *Id.* Indeed, “[t]he amount that advertisers pay to use AdWords is determined through an auction process that generates a separate cost for *each* advertiser for *each* ad and

for *each* click, with the specific amounts determined by the interplay of the bidding strategies of the participating advertisers in a given auction.” ER22-23. There is simply no feasible way to recreate those individual auctions on a classwide basis. Further complicating matters, “the amount of restitution due must account for the benefits received from ads placed on parked domains and error pages.” ER24. But “advertisers have widely varying goals, which makes it difficult to calculate the actual value of what advertisers received for their payments to Google.” ER23.

Plaintiffs had proposed three methods of calculating restitution, none of which “sufficiently [took] into account the unique circumstances surrounding the AdWords auctions.” ER24. Plaintiffs’ primary proposal—which is the focus on appeal—is called the “Smart Pricing Method.” “Smart Pricing” refers to a discount that Google gives advertisers as a business accommodation in certain circumstances. It involves looking at the aggregate performance of ads on a given webpage, and comparing it to the performance of ads on a benchmark page like google.com. Performance is measured by a “conversion rate,” which is the rate at which a click on an advertisement leads to a particular business result for the advertiser, like a purchase or a sign-up. ADD5. Google uses Smart Pricing in certain contexts to discount the cost-per-click bid on a website with lower performance.

Plaintiffs sought to use that Smart Pricing discount as a way to measure restitution. The “ ‘Smart Pricing Method’ would apply a uniform discount on all ads placed on a parked domain—even if an individual advertiser’s ads on that web page outperformed ads appearing on other types of websites.” ER24. Take one of the named plaintiffs, RK West, as an example. RK West had a *higher* conversion rate on parked domains than on the benchmark site. In other words, RK West benefited from Google’s practice because its performance was *better* on parked domains. Because of this, the District Court correctly concluded that “applying a uniform discount” to all putative class members, regardless of their circumstances, was “too inexact a solution.” ER28. It held that “individualized issues of restitution permeate the class claims,” and “the proposed class is not ‘sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’ ” ER25 (quoting *Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)).

A panel of this Court reversed. It held, first, that difficulties in calculating individual restitution amounts cannot be the basis for refusing to certify a class. “[D]amage calculations alone cannot defeat certification.” ADD14 (quoting *Yokoyama*, 594 F.3d at 1094). Based on that principle, the panel did not even consider whether individual restitution questions would predominate over common class issues. Second, the panel found that a simple formula based on the Smart Pricing Method was an acceptable way to measure restitution for class members.

“Because restitution \* \* \* measures what the advertiser would have paid at the outset, rather than accounting for what occurred after the purchase, using a ratio from Google’s data that adjusts for web page quality is both targeted to remedying the alleged harm and does not turn on individual circumstances.” ADD20. The panel therefore reversed the District Court and remanded.

### **REASONS WHY REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED**

#### **THE PANEL’S OPINION BREAKS WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE LAW IN OTHER CIRCUITS.**

It is common ground that a class action is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” *Wal-Mart*, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 (quotation marks omitted). A party seeking class certification “must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance” with Rule 23, and a district court can certify a class only if it finds, “after a rigorous analysis,” that the requirements of the Rule are satisfied. *Id.* at 2551. The “predominance” requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is particularly “demanding.” *Comcast*, 133 S. Ct. at 1432. Rule 23(b)(3) is “designed for situations in which class-action treatment is not as clearly called for,” so courts have a “duty to take a close look at whether common questions predominate over individual ones.” *Id.* (quotation marks omitted).

The District Court performed its “duty”; the panel did not. Two broad legal errors stand out. First, the panel held that any individual issues affecting recovery,

as opposed to liability, are irrelevant to the predominance analysis. Second, the panel approved a mode of calculating classwide restitution based on extrapolating from an average plaintiff, even though the proper level of restitution varies with the circumstances of each plaintiff. In arriving at these holdings, the panel glossed over significant dissension from other circuits and neglected the Supreme Court's two most significant recent holdings on the law of class actions. This Court should grant rehearing and affirm the District Court.

**A. The Supreme Court and Other Circuits Have Held That Damage Calculations Must Be Considered in the Predominance Analysis.**

The conflict between the panel's opinion and the Supreme Court's decision in *Comcast* could hardly be starker. Here are the panel's words:

[D]amage calculations alone cannot defeat certification.

ADD14 (quotation marks omitted). And here are *Comcast*'s:

[I]t is clear that, under the proper standard for evaluating certification, [plaintiffs'] model falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis. Without presenting another methodology, [plaintiffs] cannot show Rule 23(b)(3) predominance: Questions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.

133 S. Ct. at 1433. These two holdings cannot be reconciled.

The panel, for its part, tried to minimize *Comcast* as standing for a narrow proposition: A proposed classwide damages model must be designed to measure only the damages attributable to the class's theory of liability. ADD15-16. But



that was only half of the calculus in *Comcast*. The Court held that the plaintiffs’ model “must measure only those damages attributable to [their] theory” of liability *in order to* “establish that damages are susceptible of measurement across the entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).” 133 S. Ct. at 1433. By skipping over the punch line, the panel untethered the specific error in *Comcast* from its source in Rule 23(b)(3). In other words, *Comcast* stands for the principle that individualized damages issues alone *can* defeat predominance, and the principle was transgressed in that particular case because plaintiffs’ failure to offer an appropriately tailored class damages model left damages issues overwhelmingly individualized—and predominating over common issues of liability.<sup>1</sup> The panel missed that point entirely.

The other courts of appeals have overwhelmingly concurred. For example, in the very same opinion that the panel curiously cited for support, the Second Circuit wrote: “*Comcast* reiterated that damages questions *should be considered* at the certification stage when weighing predominance issues.” *Roach*, 778 F.3d at 408 (emphasis added). Three other circuits have agreed. *See, e.g., In re Nexium Antitrust Litig.*, 777 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2015) (“To meet the predominance

---

<sup>1</sup> *Comcast*’s holding follows directly from Rule 23(b)(3) itself: Before certifying a class, a district court must find that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” The Rule applies equally to questions pertaining to liability and damages.

requirement, the party seeking certification must show that \* \* \* damages would \* \* \* be established by sufficiently common proof.” (quotation marks and emphasis omitted)); *Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy Inc.*, 725 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2013) (“material differences in damages determinations” that “require individualized inquiries” may “destroy[]” predominance); *Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co.*, 595 F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010) (“individualized damage determinations cut against class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)”).

The D.C. Circuit has gone even further. “Before [*Comcast*],” it explained, “the case law was far more accommodating to class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).” *In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.*, 725 F.3d 244, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013). But now, “[c]ommon questions of fact *cannot* predominate where there exists no reliable means of proving classwide injury in fact.” *Id.* at 252-253 (emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit offered this terse summary of the new regime: “No damages model, no predominance, no class certification.” *Id.* at 253. That is, of course, the polar opposite of the rule the panel adopted here—that individualized recovery questions can *never* defeat certification.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> The Fifth Circuit appears to be internally split on the issue. In *In re Deepwater Horizon*, 739 F.3d 790, 815 (5th Cir. 2014), a panel of the Fifth Circuit said that *Comcast* is “simply inapplicable” when “predominance was based not on common issues of damages but on the numerous common issues of liability.” In an earlier

In short, the panel erred in holding that the profusion of individual recovery questions in this case is irrelevant to the predominance analysis. That position is impossible to square with *Comcast* and contravenes the weight of authority in other circuits. The Court should grant rehearing or rehearing en banc.

**B. The Panel’s Embrace of “Trial by Formula” Conflicts with Supreme Court and Sister Circuit Precedent.**

The panel also endorsed a type of “Trial by Formula” for restitution calculations that is at odds not only with *Wal-Mart* but with the bulk of the other courts of appeals. It approved the “Smart Pricing Method” to calculate restitution for all class members—a method that, according to Plaintiffs and the panel, measures “the difference between what advertisers actually paid and what they would have paid had Google informed them that their ads were being placed on parked domains and error pages.” ADD7. Plaintiffs’ proposed method purports to identify what the advertisers “would have paid” using “the Smart Pricing discount ratio,” *id.*, a uniform discount rate that compares the average performance of advertisements on those types of pages to the average performance of advertisements on a benchmark site. The problem is that this method is far too blunt a tool under Supreme Court precedent for calculating classwide restitution. It enlarges the substantive rights of the putative class members by granting expansive

---

decision, however, the Fifth Circuit had aligned itself with the majority view. *Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.*, 461 F.3d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 2006).

recovery to those who have suffered no injury; it precludes Google from offering the individualized defenses that the District Court would otherwise have to factor into its discretionary determination whether to grant restitutionary relief; and it ends up producing arbitrary results unrelated to the circumstances of any individual advertiser.

*Wal-Mart* reversed a panel of this Court that—like the panel here—“believed that it was possible to replace [remedial] proceedings with Trial by Formula.” 131 S. Ct. at 2561. The plaintiffs had identified a sample set of class members, calculated damages for that sample set, and then extrapolated classwide damages from that sample. But the Supreme Court “disapprove[d] that novel project.” *Id.* “Because the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b); a class cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.” *Id.* (citation omitted).

The panel’s opinion has just that effect. It approves a recovery model that would provide restitution to advertisers who *benefited* from Google’s display of their advertisements on parked domains. Plaintiffs’ Smart Pricing Method of restitution sweeps into its reach those with no injury. That is an Article III problem—and one on which the Supreme Court has recently granted review. *See* Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, *Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo*, No. 14-1146

(second question presented); *infra* at 18. It is also a Rules Enabling Act problem because it gives class members substantive recovery that would be unavailable to them as individual plaintiffs.

In particular, the panel’s decision expands the substantive rights of putative class members by requiring the District Court to decide restitutionary recovery on a classwide basis, relying on the average experience of advertisers. California law, however, is quite clear that a trial court exercises complete discretion whether to order restitution for a statutory violation. *Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (2000). And to properly exercise that discretion, the court “must” consider “the equities between the parties.” *Id.* at 181. This inquiry is inherently individualized, requiring the court to calculate “the excess of what the plaintiff gave the defendant over the value of what the plaintiff received.” *Id.* at 174. It must consider whether “[t]he offending party \* \* \* [has] obtained something to which it was not entitled *and*” whether “the victim \* \* \* [has] given up something which he or she was entitled to keep.” *Day v. AT&T Corp.*, 63 Cal. App. 4th 325, 340 (1998). Indeed, as the California Court of Appeal recently recognized, “[g]enerally, a party seeking restitution must return any benefit received.” *In re Tobacco Cases II*, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 881, 895 (Ct. App. 2015). There is simply no “authority for the proposition that a plaintiff seeking restitution

may retain some unexpected boon, yet \* \* \* profit from a restitutionary award.” *Id.* at 896 (quotation marks omitted).

That is precisely what Plaintiffs seek to do here. The District Court therefore cannot measure the proper amount of restitution on a classwide basis in this case, where many advertisers—like one of the named plaintiffs here—actually achieve *higher* conversion rates on parked domains and error pages than on the Smart Pricing benchmarks. The Smart Pricing method “would apply a uniform discount for *all* ads placed on a parked domain.” ER24 (emphasis added). In this way, Plaintiffs seek to use a formula that would award restitution to those who *gained* or were simply uninjured by Google’s supposed misconduct. To allow Plaintiffs to use the class action mechanism in that way would “enlarge” their substantive rights, plain and simple. “[A] class cannot be certified on the premise that [Google] will not be entitled to litigate” the actual amount of restitution owed to Plaintiffs, and the panel should not have done it. *Wal-Mart*, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.

Finally, the panel’s decision papers over variation in appropriate restitutionary recovery in the service of class certification. The panel quotes *Marsu, B.V. v. Walt Disney Co.*, 185 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 1999)—a case brought by an individual plaintiff in an individual capacity—and reasons that all that is required is a rough “‘approximation’” of damages. ADD19 (quoting *Marsu*, 185 F.3d at 939). The *Marsu* case says nothing about *classwide* damages calculations,

however, or even the particular remedy at issue here: restitution. In any event, the panel saw it as a benefit that its approved measure of restitution did “not turn on individual circumstances,” ADD20—not because they did not exist, or were irrelevant, but because Plaintiffs had come up with a formula that could gloss over those individual differences. That produces exactly the type of arbitrary results that *Comcast* warned against when the Court rejected a rule providing that “at the class-certification stage *any* method of measurement is acceptable so long as it can be applied classwide.” 133 S. Ct. at 1433. “Such a proposition would reduce Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement to a nullity.” *Id.*

Unsurprisingly, then, the panel’s decision also conflicts with a number of other circuits. The Second Circuit, for instance, rejected a similar attempt to calculate damages in the aggregate based on “an estimate of the average loss for each plaintiff.” *McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co.*, 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008). The Court explained:

[S]uch an aggregate determination is likely to result in an astronomical damages figure that does not accurately reflect the number of plaintiffs actually injured by defendants and that bears little or no relationship to the amount of economic harm actually caused by defendants.

*Id.* Other courts have also disapproved calculating classwide damages based “on abstract analysis of ‘averages.’” *Broussard*, 155 F.3d at 343 (4th Cir.); *see also Epenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC*, 705 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2013); *In re Fibreboard Corp.*, 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990). On the other hand, two circuits have

arguably approved formulaic or statistical models of proof akin to what the panel approved here. *In re Urethane Antitrust Litig.*, 768 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2014); *Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc.*, 765 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2014).

The Supreme Court granted *certiorari* in the latter case—*Tyson Foods*—in June 2015. 135 S. Ct. 2806. One of the questions presented is “[w]hether differences among individual class members may be ignored and a class action certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) \* \* \* where liability and damages will be determined with statistical techniques that presume all class members are identical to the average observed in a sample.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, *Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo*, No. 14-1146. The fact that the Court granted the petition testifies to the present disarray in the courts of appeals resulting from the failure to heed *Comcast* and *Wal-Mart*, as well as the practical importance of the class certification standard. The panel opinion contributes to that disarray, and this Court should grant rehearing to correct it.

The Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in *Tyson Foods* may be pertinent to the resolution of this one. But this Court need not wait; it can and should vacate the panel opinion and affirm the District Court on the basis of *Wal-Mart* and *Comcast*. Indeed, the first issue discussed in this petition—whether individual damages are relevant to predominance—is a sufficient reason to vacate the panel opinion, and it is not directly presented in the *Tyson Foods* case. If, however, this



Court determines that the issues in this petition and the issues in *Tyson Foods* are sufficiently intertwined, it could hold the present rehearing petition in abeyance until *Tyson Foods* is decided, and then dispose of this case as proper at that time.

### CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, rehearing should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL G. RHODES  
WHITTY SOMVICHIAN  
KYLE C. WONG  
COOLEY LLP  
101 California Street, 5th Floor  
San Francisco, CA 94111-5800  
(415) 693-2000  
rhodesmg@cooley.com  
wsomvichian@cooley.com  
kwong@cooley.com

/s/ Neal Kumar Katyal  
NEAL KUMAR KATYAL  
MARY HELEN WIMBERLY  
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP  
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20004  
(202) 637-5600  
neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com  
maryhelen.wimberly@hoganlovells.com

THOMAS P. SCHMIDT  
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP  
875 Third Avenue  
New York, N.Y. 10022  
(212) 918-5547  
thomas.schmidt@hoganlovells.com

October 19, 2015

*Counsel for Defendant-Appellee  
Google Inc.*

## **CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE**

I certify pursuant to Circuit Rules 35-4 and 40-1 that the attached petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and contains 4,180 words.

/s/ Neal Kumar Katyal  
Neal Kumar Katyal

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system on October 19, 2015.

I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

/s/ Neal Kumar Katyal  
Neal Kumar Katyal

**FOR PUBLICATION**

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

PULASKI & MIDDLEMAN, LLC; JIT  
PACKAGING, INC.; RK WEST, INC.;  
RICHARD OESTERLING,  
*Plaintiffs-Appellants,*

v.

GOOGLE, INC., a Delaware  
corporation,  
*Defendant-Appellee.*

No. 12-16752

D.C. No.  
5:08-cv-03369-  
EJD

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Northern District of California  
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted  
December 9, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed September 21, 2015

Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Richard A. Paez Circuit  
Judges and Gordon J. Quist,\* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Paez

---

\* The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

**SUMMARY\*\***

---

**Class Action / Restitution**

The panel reversed the district court's denial of class certification in an action brought by a putative class of internet advertisers under California's Unfair Competition Law and Fair Advertising Law, alleging that Google, Inc. misled them; and remanded for further proceedings.

The plaintiff alleged that Google misled advertisers by failing to disclose the placement of AdWorks ads on parked domains and error pages; and sought, on behalf of the putative class, restitution of moneys Google wrongfully obtained from the putative class.

The panel held that the district court erred in denying class certification based on its finding that the putative class did not meet the predominance requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The panel held that the district court erred by conflating restitution calculation with the liability inquiry for Unfair Competition Law and Fair Advertising Law claims, and by failing to follow the rule in *Yokoyama v. Midland National Life Insurance Co.*, 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that damages calculations alone cannot defeat class certification). The panel further held that the plaintiff's proposed method for calculating restitution was not "arbitrary" under *Comcast Corp. v. Behrend*, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).

---

\*\* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

**COUNSEL**

Miranda P. Kolbe (argued), Robert C. Schubert, and Willem F. Jonckheer, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, San Francisco, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Michael G. Rhodes (argued), Whitty Somvichian, and Kyle C. Wong, Cooley LLP, San Francisco, California; Heather Meservy, Cooley LLP, San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

---

**OPINION**

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

Between 2004 and 2008, many online internet advertisers used Google, Inc.’s (“Google”) AdWords program, an auction-based program through which advertisers would bid for Google to place their advertisements on websites. Pulaski & Middleman, LLC and several other named plaintiffs (“Pulaski”)<sup>1</sup> brought this putative class action under California’s Unfair Competition and Fair Advertising Laws, alleging that Google misled them as to the types of websites on which their advertisements could appear. The putative class initially sought injunctive and restitutionary relief. After Google changed certain features of the AdWords program, Pulaski, upon filing a Third Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, abandoned the claim for injunctive

---

<sup>1</sup> Hereafter, “Pulaski” refers collectively to Pulaski & Middleman, LLC and the other named plaintiffs, JIT Packaging Inc., RK West, Inc., and Richard Oesterling.

relief. The only relief the putative class now seeks is the equitable remedy of restitution.

Pulaski appeals the district court's denial of class certification. The district court held that on the claim for restitution, common questions did not predominate over questions affecting individual class members. In denying certification, the court reasoned that it was not bound by our decision in *Yokoyama v. Midland National Life Insurance Co.*, 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). It then explained that determining which class members are entitled to restitution and what amount each class member should receive would require individual inquiries that "permeate the class claims."

Pulaski argues that the district court erred in failing to follow *Yokoyama*. As explained below, we agree. We therefore reverse the denial of class certification and remand for further proceedings.

## **I. Background**

### **A.**

This case concerns Google's AdWords program, an auction-based program through which Google served as an intermediary between website hosts and advertisers. Through AdWords, internet advertisers provided advertisements to Google and its third party website-owner partners. To participate, advertisers entered Google-defined variables into the AdWords interface on Google's website, including the maximum price per ad they would be willing to pay and their overall budget. They also selected which Google-defined categories of websites they wanted to display the ad.

Afterwards, using an auction-based algorithm, AdWords determined the online placement and price of the ad. Thus, during the class period, advertisers did not know in advance exactly where their ads would appear.

Advertisers paid a particular price to Google each time an Internet user “clicked” on their displayed ad. The price of a particular click depended on several factors: the maximum bids of other AdWords customers for clicks based on the same search term, a “quality score” of the advertisement, and a “Smart Pricing” discount applied to the website where the ad had been placed. Google created and instituted Smart Pricing, an internally-calculated price adjustment, to adjust the advertiser’s bids to the same levels that a “rational advertiser” would bid if the rational advertiser had sufficient data about the performance of ads on each website. Smart Pricing is a ratio calculated by dividing the conversion rate<sup>2</sup> for the lower-quality website by the conversion rate for the same ad on google.com.

There are several categories of websites in play. During the class period, an advertiser using AdWords could request that its ads appear on Search Feed sites, Content Network sites, or both. Search Feed sites display AdWords ads along with search results after a user searches for information using a particular search term. After entering a particular term, a user would be presented with both ordinary search results and ads related to the search term. Content Network websites, on the other hand, are full content sites, like nytimes.com, that

---

<sup>2</sup> Using Google’s terminology, a “conversion” occurs when a “click” leads to a particular business result defined by the advertiser, like a purchase or a sign-up. A conversion rate is the “number of conversions divided by the number of ad clicks over a defined period of time.”



publish information independent of search results. Ads would appear on these sites if the ad's keywords matched those of the website.

There are other categories of sites that did not appear in the AdWords registration process: parked domains and error pages. Parked domain pages are undeveloped domains whose pages appear when users type generic terms into a web browser. These are pages of ads without content. Error pages appear when a person inputs an unregistered web address, or something other than a web address, into a web browser's address bar. Typing this information into an address bar used to result in error messages, but during the class period inputting this information resulted in error pages that offered ads. Even though only Search Feed and Content Network websites were listed in the AdWords registration process, AdWords ads appeared on both parked domains and error pages.

### **B.**

Pulaski alleges that Google misled advertisers, violating California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 *et seq.*,<sup>3</sup> and California's Fair Advertising Law ("FAL"), § 17500 *et seq.*, by failing to disclose the placement of AdWords ads on parked domains and error pages. The putative class consists of "[a]ll persons or entities located within the United States who, from July 11, 2004 through March 31, 2008 . . . had an AdWords account with Google and were charged for clicks on advertisements appearing on parked domain and/or error page websites,"

---

<sup>3</sup> All section references hereafter refer to the California Business and Professions Code.

with exclusions.<sup>4</sup> Pulaski, on behalf of the putative class, seeks restitution of moneys Google wrongfully obtained from the putative class.

Pulaski moved for class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 23”) for a Rule 23(b)(3) class. Pulaski proposed three different methods for calculating restitution, all of which were based on a “but for” or “out-of-pocket loss” calculation: the difference between what advertisers actually paid and what they would have paid had Google informed them that their ads were being placed on parked domains and error pages. The first approach is based on Google’s Smart Pricing formula as described above. The amount of restitution owed a class member would be the difference between the amount the advertiser actually paid and the amount paid reduced by the Smart Pricing discount ratio. The second method is the Content Pricing approach,<sup>5</sup> which factors in the lower bidding that would have occurred had advertisers been allowed to bid separately on parked domains and error pages. Search Feed clicks were priced higher than Content Network clicks, which in turn were considered more desirable than parked domains and error pages. Accordingly, where the same ad appeared both in the Search Feed and on Content Network websites, those Content Network ad prices could serve as a conservative but-for price for Search Feed clicks on parked domains and error pages. The third method is the Full

---

<sup>4</sup> Beginning in March 2008, the AdWords interface allowed advertisers to exclude parked domain and error pages from the set of websites on which their ads could appear.

<sup>5</sup> This method focuses on clicks on parked domains and error pages in Google’s Search Feed, not on Content Network websites.

Refund approach, in which advertisers would receive full refunds for clicks on ads placed on parked domains and error pages. Because some methods may work better than others for certain subsets of class members, Pulaski presented these methods as possibly complementary.

In ruling on the class certification motion, the district court initially found that the proposed class satisfied all of the criteria under Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. The court next turned to the predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3). On that issue, it found that, even assuming the plaintiff class could prevail on liability, common questions did not predominate on the issues of entitlement to restitution and amount of restitution due each class member.

First, the court expressed concern that individual questions may arise in ascertaining entitlement to restitution. It observed that “the question of which advertisers among the hundreds of thousands of proposed class members are even entitled to restitution would require individual inquiries.” In particular, the court was concerned with how to “systematic[ally] . . . identify and exclude from Plaintiffs’ proposed class the many advertisers who have no legal claim to restitution because they derived direct economic benefits from ads placed on parked domains and error pages.”

Second, the court identified individual questions that would arise in determining the amount of restitution owed to the class and individual class members. The court explained that our decision in *Yokoyama*, which held that damages calculations alone cannot defeat class certification, did not control the outcome of this issue because *Yokoyama* cited to decisions that mentioned a “workable method for calculating

monetary recovery.” Here, the court held that the plaintiffs had not proposed a method that was workable. The court explained that different costs for each advertiser, each ad, and each click, overlaid with an auction process, make it “more difficult to calculate what AdWords customers would have paid ‘but for’ the alleged misstatements or omissions.” It concluded that Pulaski’s proposed methods were insufficient to account for all of the intricacies involved, including benefits received from parked domain and error pages.

Concluding that individual questions predominated on the issue of restitution, the court denied Pulaski’s motion for class certification without addressing whether class treatment was a superior method for resolving the dispute as required by Rule 23(b)(3). Thereafter, Pulaski filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied.

We granted permission to appeal the order denying class action certification as authorized by Rule 23(e). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e).

## II. Standard of Review

A district court’s class certification ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. *See Parra v. Bashas’, Inc.*, 536 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2008). “A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” *United States v. Hinkson*, 585 F.3d 1247, 1259 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting *Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.*, 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)). “[W]hen an appellant raises the argument that the district court premised a class certification determination on an error of law, our first task is to evaluate whether such legal error occurred.” *Yokoyama*, 594 F.3d at

1091. “If the district court’s determination was premised on a legal error, we will find a per se abuse of discretion.” *Id.* Otherwise, “we will proceed to review the district court’s class certification decision for abuse of discretion as we have always done.” *Id.*

### III. Discussion

To obtain certification, a putative class must satisfy four prerequisites:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Rule 23(a). Additionally, the proposed class must qualify as one of the types of class actions identified in Rule 23(b). Here, Pulaski sought to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must find that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” and that a class action is “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”

Pulaski must “affirmatively demonstrate . . . compliance with the Rule.” *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). The question of certification requires a “rigorous analysis.” *Id.* Courts may have to “probe behind

the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question.” *Id.*

The district court denied certification because it found that the putative class did not meet the predominance requirement. It explained that questions regarding which advertisers are entitled to restitution in the first instance, and the amount of restitution owed to each advertiser, both defeat predominance. We disagree.

A.

Entitlement to restitution is a separate inquiry from the amount of restitution owed under California’s UCL and FAL. To the extent that the district court rested its holding that common questions do not predominate on the putative class’s entitlement to restitution, it committed legal error.

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” § 17200. The FAL prohibits “untrue or misleading” statements in the course of business. § 17500. This language is “broad” and “sweeping” to “protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services.” *Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Ct.*, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 320 (2011).

To state a claim under the UCL or the FAL “based on false advertising or promotional practices, it is necessary only to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” *In re Tobacco II Cases*, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 312 (2009);<sup>6</sup> *see also*

---

<sup>6</sup> Since the passage of California’s Proposition 64 in 2004, private suits must also allege standing under the UCL and FAL, i.e., that the plaintiff “suffered injury in fact” and “lost money or property as a result of unfair

*Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp.*, 655 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a district court erred in denying class certification by requiring individualized proof of reliance and causation, and remanding in light of *In re Tobacco II Cases*), *cert. denied*, 132 S. Ct. 1970 (2012). This inquiry does not require “individualized proof of deception, reliance and injury.” *In re Tobacco II Cases*, 46 Cal. 4th at 320; *Stearns*, 655 F.3d at 1020 (same). “[I]n effect, California has created what amounts to a conclusive presumption that when a defendant puts out tainted bait and a person sees it and bites, the defendant has caused an injury; restitution is the remedy.” *Stearns*, 655 F.3d at 1021 n. 13.<sup>7</sup>

---

competition.” *Kwikset*, 51 Cal. 4th at 320–21 (noting that the proposition “curtailed the universe of those who may enforce” the UCL and FAL, although the laws’ “substantive reach . . . remains expansive”). There is a two-part test for standing under the UCL and FAL: the person must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as an injury in fact, i.e., *economic injury*, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., *caused by*, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” *Id.* at 322. Here, the district court determined that one of the class representatives had standing to sue, and that the class representative’s standing satisfied the standing requirements for the putative class as a whole. Neither party challenges the district court’s ruling on statutory standing. We therefore do not address it.

<sup>7</sup> *Stearns*, which was decided before the district court’s ruling here, also noted that predominance may not exist in a UCL case in which different members of the class were “exposed to quite disparate information from various representatives of the defendant.” 655 F.3d at 1020. We have elaborated on this concept in two cases that post-date the district court’s order. See *Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.*, 666 F.3d 581, 596 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that common questions did not predominate where disparate information exposure undercut presumption of reliance); *Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc.*, 741 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that predominance did not exist for a putative UCL class whose members had each been exposed to one of five different contracts, each of which

Under the UCL:

Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court may make such orders or judgments, including the appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.

§ 17203. This language, as well as “nearly identical” language under the FAL, *see* § 17535, grants a court discretion to order restitution. *Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 163, 173 (2000).

---

may or may not have alerted customers that a damage waiver was an optional purchase). Google argues that the facts here present an example of disparate exposure under this line of cases. Pulaski responds that Google’s deception was pervasive: all AdWords customers could select Search Feed pages, Content Network pages, or both; parked domain and error pages were never mentioned in AdWords’s sign-up materials; Google’s contracts with advertisers never disclosed that Google would place their ads on parked domains and error pages, regardless of whether they chose Search Feed pages, Content Network pages, or both; and Google’s materials answering frequently asked questions did not disclose ad placement on parked domain and error pages. Because Pulaski’s claim rests on allegations of deception through omission and falsehoods via the AdWords sign-up materials, all of which were presented to putative class members through the same online portal, Google’s argument that disparate information defeats predominance is unpersuasive.



Thus, a court need not make individual determinations regarding entitlement to restitution. Instead, restitution is available on a classwide basis once the class representative makes the threshold showing of liability under the UCL and FAL. Accordingly, the district court erred in holding that such individual questions would predominate.

### B.

We held in *Yokoyama* that “damage calculations alone cannot defeat certification.” 594 F.3d at 1094. By concluding that it was not bound by *Yokoyama* under the circumstances presented in this case, the district court erred.

*Yokoyama* concerned the Hawaii Deceptive Practices Act, Haw. Rev. Stat § 480–2. We concluded that the district court erred when it held that this law required individualized showings of reliance because Hawaii courts’ caselaw “look[ed] to a reasonable consumer, not the particular consumer.” *Id.* at 1092. As we noted, the case, at the liability stage, would “not require the fact-finder to parse what oral representations each broker made to each plaintiff.” *Id.* at 1093. Rather, the liability portion would be uniform, as it “will focus on the standardized written material given to all plaintiffs to determine whether those materials are likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.” *Id.* Because it committed legal error, its denial of class certification was a “[p]er [s]e [a]buse of [d]iscretion.” *Id.*

The district court in *Yokoyama* also erroneously concluded that the “damages calculation involved highly individualized and fact-specific determinations,” a conclusion to which the district court’s premise of subjective reliance

may have contributed. *Id.* In examining predominance for class certification purposes, the district court had considered factors such as:

the financial circumstances and objectives of each class member; their ages; the [indexed annuity product (“IAP”)] selected; any changes in the fixed interest rate for that particular IAP; the performance of the selected index; any changes in the index margin for that particular IAP; any cap on the indexed interest; the length of the surrender periods; whether the individual had undertaken or wanted to undertake an early withdrawal of funds; any benefit the individual policy holder derived from the form of the annuity itself, including the tax-deferral of credited interest; and the actual rate of return on the IAP.

*Id.* at 1093–94. We held that, even though all these variables impacted damages calculations, the individualized calculations did not defeat predominance. *Id.* at 1093; *see also Stearns*, 655 F.3d at 1026 (“We have held that the mere fact that there might be differences in damage calculations is not sufficient to defeat class certification.” (citing *Yokoyama*)).

Google argues that *Comcast Corp. v. Behrend*, — U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013), called *Yokoyama*’s holding into question. There, in analyzing a putative antitrust class, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ proposed damages model fell “far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis.” *Id.* at 1433. The district

and circuit courts had failed to inquire into whether the model translated the “legal theory of the harmful event into an analysis of the economic impact of that event.” *Id.* at 1435 (emphasis omitted). The Court reasoned that “a model purporting to serve as evidence of damages in [a] class action must measure only those damages attributable to that theory. If the model does not even attempt to do that, it cannot possibly establish that damages are susceptible of measurement across the entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).” *Id.* at 1433. In such a situation, “[q]uestions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.” *Id.*

Since *Comcast*, we have continued to apply *Yokoyama*’s central holding. In *Levy v. Medline Industries, Inc.*, we reaffirmed that damage calculations alone cannot defeat class certification. 716 F.3d 510, 513–14 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing *Yokoyama*). We explained that *Comcast* stood for the proposition that “plaintiffs must be able to show that their damages stemmed from the defendant’s actions that created the legal liability.” *Id.* at 514; *see also Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp.*, 778 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 2015) (“*Comcast* held that a model for determining classwide damages relied upon to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) must actually measure damages that result from the class’s asserted theory of injury; but the Court did not hold that proponents of class certification must rely upon a classwide damages model to demonstrate predominance.”). The putative class’s problem in *Comcast* was that the damages model “did not isolate damages resulting from any one theory of antitrust impact.” *Levy*, 715 F.3d at 514 (quoting *Comcast*, 133 S. Ct at 1431). Following this discussion, we reversed a denial of class certification in part because the “damages could feasibly and

efficiently be calculated once the common liability questions are adjudicated.” *Id.*

We reaffirmed the proposition that differences in damage calculations do not defeat class certification after *Comcast* in *Jimenez v. Allstate Insurance Co.*, 765 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Levy*, including the portion quoting *Yokoyama*). As we explained, our sister circuits have adopted “[s]imilar positions” since *Comcast*. *See id.* at 1167–68 (citing cases from the Sixth, Seventh, and Fifth Circuits); *see also Roach*, 778 F.3d at 407–08 (citing cases from the First, Tenth, Fifth, Seventh, and Sixth Circuits, as well as *Levy* and *Yokoyama*, to support the proposition that *Comcast* did not hold that Rule 23(b)(3) requires a classwide basis for damages calculation).

In sum, *Yokoyama* remains the law of this court, even after *Comcast*. Because “[d]amages calculations alone . . . cannot defeat certification” under *Yokoyama*, the district court erred in concluding that *Yokoyama* “does not apply to the facts here.” Thus, it abused its discretion in denying class certification on this basis. *See Yokoyama*, 594 F.3d at 1090–92.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> Google also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in *Dukes* bars class certification here because, under *Dukes*, certification is inappropriate based on a lone common question. However, this argument is contrary to *Dukes*, which stated that “for the purposes of Rule 23(a)(2), even a single common question will do.” 131 S. Ct. at 2556. Further, the plaintiffs in *Dukes* were pursuing a Rule 23(b)(2) class, rather than a (b)(3) class. *Id.* at 2548–49. As the Court made clear, it did not analyze Rule 23(b)(3). *Id.* at 2549 n.2.

**C.**

Google argues that the district court properly denied Pulaski's motion for certification under *Comcast* because the proposed method for calculating restitution was "arbitrary," and thus does not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. *See Comcast*, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. We disagree.

Restitution is "the return of the excess of what the plaintiff gave the defendant over the value of what the plaintiff received." *Cortez*, 23 Cal. 4th at 174. Restitution has two purposes: "to restore the defrauded party to the position he would have had absent the fraud," and "to deny the fraudulent party any benefits, whether or not for[e]seeable, which derive from his wrongful act." *Nelson v. Serwold*, 687 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing the Restatement of Restitution).

Restitution under the UCL and FAL "must be of a measurable amount to restore to the plaintiff what has been acquired by violations of the statutes, and that measurable amount must be supported by evidence." *Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc.*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 663, 698 (2006). Where a defendant has wrongfully obtained a plaintiff's property, "the measure of recovery for the benefit received . . . is the value of the property at the time of its improper acquisition . . . or a higher value if this is required to avoid injustice" where the property has changed in value. *Id.* at 698–99 (quoting the Restatement of Restitution). Where plaintiffs are "deceived by misrepresentations into making a purchase, the economic harm is the same: the consumer has purchased a product that he or she *paid more for* than he or she otherwise might have been willing to pay if the product had been labeled accurately." *Kwikset*, 51 Cal.

4th at 329 (emphasis in original). As the California Supreme Court explained while discussing economic harm in the context of standing, this measure “is the same whether or not a court might objectively view the products as functionally equivalent”:

Two wines might to almost any palate taste indistinguishable—but to serious oenophiles, the difference between one year and the next, between grapes from one valley and another nearby, might be sufficient to carry with it real economic differences in how much they would pay. Nonkosher meat might taste and in every respect be nutritionally identical to kosher meat, but to an observant Jew who keeps kosher, the former would be worthless.

*Id.* at 329–30. Applying these concepts to other forms of fraudulent omission, UCL and FAL restitution is based on what a purchaser would have paid at the time of purchase had the purchaser received all the information.

In calculating damages, here restitution, California law “requires only that some reasonable basis of computation of damages be used, and the damages may be computed even if the result reached is an approximation.” *Marsu, B.V. v. Walt Disney Co.*, 185 F.3d 932, 938–39 (9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he fact that the amount of damage may not be susceptible of exact proof or may be uncertain, contingent or difficult of ascertainment does not bar recovery.” *Id.* at 939.

We conclude that Pulaski’s proposed method was not “arbitrary,” as Google argues. The calculation need not account for benefits received after purchase because the focus

is on the value of the service at the time of purchase. Instead, in calculating restitution under the UCL and FAL, the focus is on the difference between what was paid and what a reasonable consumer would have paid at the time of purchase without the fraudulent or omitted information. *See Kwikset*, 51 Cal. 4th at 329.

Here, the harm alleged is Google's placement of ads on lower-quality web pages without the advertisers' knowledge. Pulaski's principal method for calculating restitution employs Google's Smart Pricing ratio, which directly addresses Google's alleged unfair practice by setting advertisers' bids to the levels a rational advertiser would have bid if it had access to all of Google's data about how ads perform on different websites. Because restitution under the UCL and FAL measures what the advertiser would have paid at the outset, rather than accounting for what occurred after the purchase, using a ratio from Google's data that adjusts for web page quality is both targeted to remedying the alleged harm and does not turn on individual circumstances. Thus, the Smart Pricing method measures the monetary loss "resulting from the particular . . . injury" alleged. *See Comcast*, 133 S. Ct. at 1434.<sup>9</sup>

#### IV. Conclusion

The district court erred by conflating restitution calculation with the liability inquiry for UCL and FAL claims, and by failing to follow our rule in *Yokoyama*.

---

<sup>9</sup> Although we do not directly analyze the Content Pricing or the Full Refund approaches, those methods may also be appropriate for calculating restitution. We express no opinion on the merits of any of the proposed methods.

---

Further, the proposed method for calculating restitution was not “arbitrary” under *Comcast*.

**REVERSED and REMANDED.**